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The notion of emergence​[2]​ has received much renewed attention recently.​[3]​  Most of the authors I survey below (§ II), including most notably Robert Batterman (2002, 2003, 2004) share the common aim of providing accounts for emergence which offer fresh insights from highly articulated and nuanced views reflecting recent developments in applied physics.  Moreover, the authors present such accounts to reveal what they consider as misrepresentative and oversimplified abstractions often depicted in standard philosophical accounts.​[4]​   With primary focus on Batterman, however, I will show (in § III), that despite (or perhaps because of) such novel and compelling insights; underlying thematic tensions and ambiguities persist nevertheless, due to subtle reifications made of particular (albeit central) mathematical methods employed in asymptotic analysis.​[5]​  I offer a potential candidate (in § IV), for regularization advanced by the theoretical physicist David Finkelstein (1996, 2002, 2004).  The mathematical methods employed and promoted by Finkelstein and his research group utilize discrete multilinear algebras (Clifford, Grassmann, etc.).  Among other things, these richly characterized multilinear algebraic theories would, for instance, serve the two-fold purpose of clearing up much of the inevitably “epistemological emergence” accompanying divergent limiting cases treated in the standard approaches​[6]​, while at the same time characterize in relatively greater detail the “ontological emergence” of particular quantum phenomena under study. 
II.  Survey of Batterman and Contemporaries
Robert Batterman (2002, 2003, 2004), for the most part, concentrates on methodological areas of concern (the nature of scientific explanation, scientific theories, and intertheoretic reduction.)  Batterman calls our attention to the nature of asymptotic analysis and explanations.​[7]​  For Batterman, asymptotic analysis and asymptotic explanations comprise a unique methodological category traditionally overlooked by most philosophers of science.  This, for instance, becomes especially true in the cases of singular limits, i.e., when the behavior of a theory in the limit of one of its central parameters  does not equal the behavior at the limit.  That is to say, given theories T and T/ referring to some domain D, where T is the theory describing what is occurring at the asymptotic limit ( = )​[8]​ of one of  T/ ‘s fundamental parameters , then T/  ‘blows up’ in the    limit (i.e. the “limit”: lim   T/   does not exist.  Otherwise, in the regular case, we can write: lim   T/ = T.)   
Aside from singular asymptotic analyses and explanations possibly providing a key insight into depicting emergent properties and phenomena, Batterman also makes the very general methodological claim that reduction and explanation can mean different things.  “[T]here are good reasons to think that reduction and explanation can part company…there are no good reasons to maintain that reduction (in all of its guises) need be essentially epistemological.” (2002, 114).  Why? “[Because] the nature of asymptotic explanation holds out on the possibility that we can explain the universality of the special sciences from the point of view of the lower level theory while maintaining the irreducibility of those sciences to physics.  Explanation and reduction must part company.” (2002, 134.)  
Other authors focus more particularly on some of the possibly unique epistemological and ontological issues this notion may entail.  For instance, Silberstein & McGeever (1999) contrast weaker and stronger ‘epistemological’ and ‘ontological’ notions.  Epistemological emergence is best understood as a kind of artefact of a certain formalism or model arising through a macroscopic or functional analysis of the theory’s ‘higher level’ descriptions or features in its domain. (1999, 182)  This is a weak notion, insofar as it connotes practical or theoretical limitations on the resolving and computing power of the theory and, in turn, of its agent.​[9]​  Epistemic emergence is metaphysically neutral.  An epistemically emergent property of an object, for example, can in principle be reducible to or determined by intrinsic properties, though being practically impossible to explain, predict, or derive.​[10]​  Ontological emergence, on the other hand, comprises features of systems/wholes possessing capacities (causal, and otherwise) not reducible to the intrinsic capacities of the parts, nor among the reducible relations among such parts (1999, 182).  Ontological emergence usually entails epistemic emergence​[11]​, but not conversely.  “Epistemological emergence cannot entail ontological emergence, because it is defined to preclude it.” (1999, 185)  On a perhaps even more strongly metaphysical note, Humphreys (1996) characterizes an ontological notion of emergence in terms of a dynamical fusion of previously two (or more) lower-level properties into a higher-level property.​[12]​
 Still others, like Robert Bishop (2004), offer classification schemes that seek to seat emergence in a more descriptive context alongside the more ‘traditional’ categories of reduction and supervenience.  For example, Bishop offers the following categories: i.) Reduction: When more fundamental properties/descriptions provide necessary and sufficient conditions for less fundamental properties/descriptions.  ii.) Contextual Emergence: When more fundamental properties/descriptions provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for less fundamental properties/descriptions.  iii.) Supervenience: When more fundamental properties/descriptions provide sufficient but not necessary conditions for less fundamental properties/descriptions.  iv.) Strong Emergence: When more fundamental properties/descriptions provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for less fundamental properties/descriptions.  (2004, 6)  As evidenced by the properties/description division, contextual and strong emergence can respectively modify ontological/epistemic senses of emergence.
Last of all, it should be mentioned that there are authors who also advance deflationary claims in response to the above.  That is to say, there are many who would deny that contemporary treatments on the notion of ‘emergence’ offer anything novel in the making.  Since I focus here primarily on the work of Batterman (2002, 2003, 2004), I will mention in passing a few counterclaims made by his contemporaries.  
In particular, Gordon Belot (2003) denies that there is anything particularly novel, in a methodological sense, about the claims of asymptotic analysis made by Batterman.  What Belot does is focus on the theory of differential equations to show that any astute mathematician, ignorant of the physical details of the particular cases Batterman (2002) refers to​[13]​, can in principle derive such solutions from the general theory alone (i.e., T/ .)  In other words, T/  possesses sufficient explanatory structure and hence the reliance of structures in T is (at best) contingent, despite such claims of necessity made by Batterman in the singular limit, when 
lim   T/   does not exist  (Belot (2003) 20-25).  According to Belot, Batterman is at best simply reifying auxiliary mathematics, hence, “in calling our attention fascinating intricacies of asymptotic analysis, [Batterman is basically no more than] calling our attention to an unjustly ignored species of Hempelian explanation, rather than elucidating a competitor to it.” (2003, n39, p22).​[14]​   Cohnitz (2002) responds to Batterman with a roughly similar charge, albeit focusing more on the logic of asymptotic explanation, rather than the mathematics of asymptotic analysis per se.  Cohnitz basically argues that Hempel’s statistical deductive-nomological model (SDN) revised by Railton adequately takes care of what Batterman describes an  “asymptotic explanation.” ​[15]​
III.  Critique of Batterman and Contemporaries: An Inadvertent Reification
Through this brief summary of the above (a small but relatively thematically representative sample of the burgeoning contemporary literature on the subject) despite all the sub-thematic variation, all contain certain common assumptions.  Recall Belot’s remark: that Batterman reifies auxiliary mathematical structures.  Batterman (2003) adequately responded against Belot by calling attention to the irreducibly empirical behavior (e.g. exhibited in the case of supersonic shocks) involving a complex interplay between superseding and superseded theories T’,T.  However, in the cases of asymptotic limits, on a more fundamentally metatheoretic level, Belot’s phrase is revealing (though for reasons, as I will give, other than what Belot had in mind.)   The ‘reification’ I  have in mind here is the (albeit understandable) tendency exhibited by all the authors surveyed above to “assume the actual is the ideal (and vice versa).​[16]​”  That is to say, to assume that the present mathematical strategies and tactics used in the ‘normal science’ of the physics community in these contexts, replete with all the ingenious bootstrapping and indiscriminate ontological mixing-and-matching (found most notoriously for instance in the renormalization group program (RGP)), is the best or the ideal paradigm.​[17]​ 
Granted, none of the authors I review here actually state this explicitly.  Yet, it seems more or less assumed​[18]​, based on a few of the all-or-nothing fallacies some of them commit, when discussing the possibility of other mathematical methods (besides standard singular asymptotics ) in characterizing (we may assume here ontologically) emergent properties.  For instance, Batterman remarks (2004, 12) one should take thermodynamics seriously, lest one is interested in “doing away with all idealizations in physics.”  However by calling the thermodynamic limit​[19]​ into question, one is obviously simply aiming for a possibly more appropriately particular idealization.   One is certainly not questioning or doing away with the heart of the contemporary theoretical physical enterprise, which of course is based on the art and science of idealizing in the appropriate manner for a particular class of phenomena under study.




I bring this up as a counterexample to Batterman’s general claims because here we have a fine example of a case of regular asymptotic analysis: The sequence of partial sums:    converge smoothly in the n  limit to the kink represented by the absolutely convergent sum S(x).
	Now, in any finite partial Fourier sum Sn sum, (where n < )  being the superposition of smooth curves, doesn’t exactly model the kink f(x), but aside from the fact that the (quantitative) error can be made arbitrarily small, (i.e., ) the qualitative difference between sum-of-smooth curves and kinky curves washes out in the regular limit.
	Now, ‘smooth’ and ‘kinky’ are topological properties.  Robert Bishop (2004) discusses the interplay between a theory’s ontology and its topology.  For instance, when he writes about the Born-Oppenheimer approximation in the characterization of molecular structure:
The Born-Oppenheimer ‘approximation’…is not simply a mathematical expansion in series form…It literally replaces the basic quantum mechanical descriptions with a new description, generated in the limit​[21]​ 0.  This replacement corresponds to a change in the algebra of observables needed for the description of molecular phenomena…The Born-Oppenheimer approach amounts to a change in topology – i.e., a change in the mathematical elements modeling physical phenomena – as well as a change in ontology—including fundamental physical elements absent from quantum mechanics.  (2004, 4)

Now, what Bishop doesn’t seem to explain clearly is how a theory’s topology and ontology interrelate.​[22]​  This produces a tension and ambiguity, resulting in what seems to be an equivocation.  For example, a/ la Batterman, when Bishop defends the asymptotic procedure as being something more than just a heuristic approximation device, he states:
[T]he crucial point of asymptotic reasoning…[has to do with] molecular structure presuppos[ing] both a new topology and a new ontology not given by quantum mechanics…It is definitely not the case that the sophisticated mathematics…somehow obscur[es] the metaphysical issues.  Rather, the metaphysical issues and practices of science are driving the sophisticated mathematics in this example. (2004, 7).

But, metaphysically speaking, since Bishop doesn’t clarify the relationship between topology and ontology it remains unclear how “metaphysical issues…driv[e] the sophisticated mathematics.”  Especially, when considering which practicing scientist to consult, most would probably view the sophisticated mathematics of such techniques, rightly or wrongly, as a heuristic device, similar in kind to the (primordial semiclassical) Bohr planetary model.  The ontology of the approximation schemes are essentially collections of heuristic devices, guiding one’s intuitions but not opening any metaphysical black boxes.
	In short, as evidenced in the above passages, Bishop seems to be reifying a sophisticated mathematical device, equivocating its topology with theoretical ontology.  As in the case of Batterman (2004), Bishop engages in a bit of all-or-nothing question-begging.  For example, considering the possibility of a future theory regularizing such asymptotically singular limits in the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, he asks rhetorically:  “Why wait for the ‘final theory’ to sort things out?”  But it is never a question of waiting for a final theory, rather always one of continually searching for more expressively superceding theories striking a more optimal balance between simplicity and strength.​[23]​
	I bring up the topology/ontology ambiguity resulting in (or from) a reification of a mathematical device (asymptotic analysis) on the part of Bishop because I believe a similar ambiguity and reification occurs in Batterman.  For example, going back to the “inappropriate” smooth curve approximation for a ‘kink,’ Batterman wants this to hold precisely because of a similarly implicit topology/ontology equivocation he makes (ontological discontinuity = topological kink).  Yet, aside from the counterexample discussed above, involving a Fourier Series, an example of an asymptotic analysis, this equivocation at best makes Batterman’s reasoning seem ambiguous in places.  And at worst, it appears to reify or to give undue over-reliance on the (characteristically non-physical) infinities comprising such methods involving the application of singular limits.  For example, in the case of the TDL:
One needs mathematics that will enable one to represent…genuine physical discontinuities.  As a result there is something deeply right about the thermodynamic representation of the singularities –the fact that the [thermodynamic] limit is singular in critical phenomena [e.g., phase transitions] is really an indication that the idealization cannot be dismissed so easily.”  (2004, 15)

On the other hand, one can argue with equal force that there’s something ‘deeply inadequate’ about a theory blowing up in the face of some physical discontinuity.  Granted, this theoretical singularity delimits the theory’s domain of reliability (telling us automatically in which instances does the theory fail) it nevertheless fails to provide information just the same.  Certainly in the case of phase transitions, for example, it was precisely why Kolmogorov and others originally applied ‘infinity-removing’ renormalization group techniques, to compensate for such singularities.  Why must, therefore, (unless one equivocates topology with ontology) such asymptotically singular cases be “essential to a foundationally respectable understanding of…physical discontinuities” (2004, 22)?  One could argue just the opposite; i.e., that once we purge a theory T of as many of its singularites as possible,(i.e. its epistemologically emergent aspects) we are on the road to superseding it, i.e., giving ourselves the chance for a (better) understanding of physical discontinuities (the oftentimes ontologically emergent phenomena) in the superseded theory  T/ .​[24]​  
Writes Bishop: 
If the expansion is singular, as in the case of the Born-Oppenheimer procedure, it [i.e. the series S() =kakk] is not uniformly convergent in the original topology of the fundamental description as an appropriate parameter tends to some limit (e.g., as 0.)  This discontinuous limiting behavior indicates the need for a change of topology.  The crucial step…is to identify a new topology which regularizes…such that it converges uniformly.  This leads to a new contextual topology associated with novel properties not defined…under the original topology, and which is associated with ontological elements also not found at the level of the fundamental…theory.  (2004, 5, italics added)

This passage naturally segues into the next section, for the very italicized sentences indicate just a few of the motivations guiding David Finkelstein’s program (1996, 2002, 2004).  A crucial difference, however, lies in the fact that Batterman, et. al., use functional-analytic techniques to look for singular asymptotic expansions in the superseding theory​[25]​ T/ to bring it into a complex interplay with aspects of the superseded theory T (i.e., the behavior of T/  at , but not in the limit).  By contrast, Finkelstein uses algebraic expansion/contraction techniques (embeddings) to expand out of T/  (characterized algebraically) into a fully regularized version T/*  characterized by a richer algebra.  Conversely, T/*  is fully regular in the sense that for any algebraic contraction parameter or structure constant . 
 I summarize some of the technical details in the next section.  In closing, however, one can understand Finkelstein’s algebraic expansion from T/  to T/*  and conversely the contraction  as paradigmatic of intertheoretic reduction, so long as “reduction” here is understood methodologically.  For, as I will argue in the next section, aspects of Finkelstein’s regularization program do much to highlight ontological emergence, by clearing away in the formalism much epistemologically emergent underbrush
.
IV.  A Brief Overview of Some of David Finkelstein’s  Methods of Algebraic Intertheoretic Reduction

	Though David Finkelstein has introduced multilinear algebras like Clifford and Grassman for the last few decades of his research​[26]​ in variously innovative and illuminating ways, I will just focus on aspects of his more recent works (Quantum Relativity (1996), Post-Quantum Relativity (2002), Finite Quantum Relativity (2004)).  They provide the most salient depictions of a (fundamentally discrete) theoretical topology characterized algebraically by an expanded structure T/* which (among other things) gives regular limits where a contracted structure T/  doesn’t.  Before I do so, however, a few disclaimers are necessary.
	First, I offer examples of aspects of Finkelstein’s algebraic methods of intertheoretic reduction not because he applies such mathematical machinery in the same contexts as examined by Batterman, et. al., (i.e., catastrophe optics, semi-classical quantum theory, liquid drop formation, etc.)  David Finkelstein’s primary motivation in this body of literature and others involves devising means to characterize through mutlilinear algebras putatively fundamentally elementary quantum microtopological elements, e.g., “chronons.”  Moreover, the algebra(s) characterizing such chronon statistics should be developed in such a manner that under certain limits of algebraic structure constants, the Standard Model can be derived, as well as the diffeomorphism group of General Relativity, after taking other limits of sets of contraction parameters.  In short, his research is part of an ongoing effort to crack the most stubbornly resisting theoretical problem of our time: deriving a theory reconciling the Standard Model of particle physics with General Relativity.​[27]​
	Second, there is clearly much in the work of Finkelstein that merits—and has received—extensive philosophical commentary, which I shall not discuss here.  Suffice it to say, however, that his metaphysical leanings, which he articulates rather extensively in selected chapters in Quantum Relativity (1996) overall fit quite well thematically with Silberstein & McGeever’s (1999) remarks concerning quantum mechanical phenomena presenting examples of ontological emergence, without necessitating epistemological emergence:
Prior to Bell, arguments regarding measurements on isolated parts, one might have viewed superposition states as merely an artifact.  The Bell results suggest that the formalism presages the existence of genuine emergent properties…[Moreover] the kind of emergence found in quantum mechanics and quantum field theory completely explodes the ontological picture of reality as divided into a ‘discrete hierarchy of levels’; rather ‘it is more likely that even if the ordering on the complexity of structures ranging from those of elementary physics to those of astrophysics and neurophysiology is discrete, the interaction between such structures will be so entangled that any separation into levels will be quite arbitrary.​[28]​’ ( Silberstein & McGeever, 1999, 189.)

Yet, on the other hand this doesn’t necessarily entail epistemological emergence, since “non-separability is [often just] a logical consequence of the dynamical equations of motion.​[29]​” (1999, 187)  In other words, preserving relativistic locality entails a holistic (ontological emergence) interpretation of the properties of the EPR-Bohm systems (188).  On the other hand, for simple 2D composite systems, for example, evolving unitarily into entangled modes (see footnote 29), there is nothing epistemically emergent occurring whatsoever.  That is to say, a simple & direct linear combination of the entangled state  |AB(h/4) = -i/2{|00 - |01 + |10 - |11} is expressed in the composite base for the two systems A and B: {| 0A, |1A}{| 0B, |1B}  {|00, |01 , |10 , |11}.  Linearization is the essence of epistemic reduction.
The metaphysical holism in Finkelstein is apparent in his rejecting the notion that quantum systems possess an absolute state.​[30]​  Instead, an interpretation of quantum theory is advanced giving primary focus on the pattern of actions an experimenter shares with the quantum system under study, as well as the patterns of actions quantum systems mutually share with one another​[31]​:
Let us assume that a physical theory should at least lead us to, if not consist of, statements of the form: ‘If we do so-and-so, we will find such-and-such.’  Suitably idealized, generalized, and algebraicized, such doings and findings become the physical units of our theory….The algebra is a language of and for action…We describe a quantum entity not by a complete description or state but by the external acts by which we prepare or register it, and by the actions transforming any experimenter into any other…The fundamental question in physics, then, is no ‘What are all things made of?’  It is rather ‘What goes on here?’…We retain Bacon’s maxim ‘Dissect nature’ but we read it (or misread it) as the injunction to dissect dynamical history into least actions, not some hypothetical static matter into atoms.  (1996, italics added, 24-25)

Hence the ontological emergence is apparent insofar as the concept of ‘act’ and action is irreducibly relational.  Moreover, the chronons, or elementary quantum units stipulated to constitute the vacuum microtopology, can combine in entangled modes (2002, 89.)  Finally, the holism is depicted in such a manner, as in the case of Silberstein and McGeever (1999, 188) which fundamentally respects  locality: in the pattern of actions, no hidden, non-local variables or properties lurk about.​[32]​  
	I made these brief remarks concerning some general metaphysical points of comparison shared by Silberstein & McGeever’s and Finkelstein’s interpretation of quantum theory to demonstrate part of my general claim here: that there can exist yet another superseding theoretical topology T/* which, on the one hand, regularizes previously singular results in the previously superseded theor(ies), while at the same time preserves and possibly even extends the ontologically emergent properties in their respective domains of interest.  Though the specific case studies of possibly strong emergence dealt with by Batterman, et. al., were not analyzed here from the standpoint of Finkelstein’s theoretical ontology and topology, as a potentially first step generally ontological issues concerning the nature of locality and emergence in quantum theory are shared  by Finkelstein and some of the aforementioned authors. 
	Now, for the methodology:  Expansion denotes the process extending out from algebraically characterized  to  , denoted: , where  is fundamental parameter characterizing the algebraic expansion (Finkelstein (2002) 4-8).  The inverse procedure:  is contraction.  The question becomes: how to regularize?  In other words, which  should one choose to guarantee a regular limit for any   in the greatest possible generality?  To answer this (recall footnote 7) consider again the case in the case of Galilean and Special Relativity.  In particular, we begin by characterizing such theories in terms of their relativity groups, i.e., the group of all dynamical symmetries.  In the case of Galilean relativity, let  , the Galilean group (i.e., the group of all dynamical transformations invariant under the Galilean transformations: .).  Similarly, let , the Lorentz group (i.e., the group of all dynamical transformations invariant under the Lorentz transformations: , where: .)  Hence we expand:
, and contract: .
	So far, all that has been done is to re-cast the most banal example of intertheoretic reduction into group theoretic language.  But as Wigner and Inonou​[33]​ first noted, the method of algebraic expansion/contraction reveals subtleties that are concealed in the typical functional-analytical approach to taking limits.  For instance, LOR is simple​[34]​ while GAL isn’t.  The infinitesimal transformation (tangents), i.e. described in terms of Lie algebra dLOR, dGAL respectively, reveal that dLOR is more stable than dGAL.  That is to say, dLOR is less sensitive to perturbations of values of its infinitesimal contraction parameter(s) and structure constants.  Last of all the Lorentz transformations are fully reciprocal (i.e. , in the sense that the couplings between space and time are fully reciprocal, i.e. the rule for transforming r contains t and vice versa) whereas the Galiean transformation aren’t (, but not vice versa, since t’ contains no expression involving r.)
	So, to summarize: we expand into an algebraic structure whose relativity group is simple, which implies the Lie algebra depicting its infinitesimal transformations is stable, which in turn entails greater reciprocity, i.e., “reciprocal couplings in the theory…reactions for every action.” (2002,10).  Finkelstein (2002,2004) follows this very general methodology of algebraic expansion into richer structures as a means to select algebraic formalisms considered most appropriate to solve the problems in his ongoing research.

V. Conclusion
	Finkelstein’s methods of intertheoretic reduction, relying on expansion and contraction of algebraic structures interests us here in this discussion because the method of expansion/contraction of algebraic structures provides another method of ‘asymptotic analysis.’  But more importantly, so long as one is careful in expanding out to algebraic structures exhibiting simplicity in their relativity groups, then one is automatically guaranteed a regular limit in the inverse process of contraction.  Thus we have an example of what Bishop was referring to as ‘another theoretical topology’ guaranteeing regular limits when the previous scheme failed and produced a singularity.  Moreover, as argued above, the theoretical ontology briefly surveyed above preserves stronger notions of ontological emergence in quantum phenomena.
	So, in these sketches presented, in a very general sense, we are left with two choices.  One can appreciate Batterman’s ideas involving the complex interplay of the structures inherent in the superseded and superseding theories in the singular cases.  But the price one pays, aside from the dangers of inadvertently reifying a fundamentally non-physical notion of infinit(ies) in the singular limit, also means one must agree to cleave explanation from reduction (for the obvious reason that reduction has failed, yet one still wishes to preserve a sense of value in the asymptotic ‘explanation’ here.)  Or one could select the route Finkelstein has for instance taken, which though his particular methods are somewhat unique in the sense of the breadth and depth he has carried out certain methods in algebraic expansion, the impetus behind his approach is quite common among the typical physicist.  This impetus can be understood as a general dissatisfaction at any singularity encountered, for the simple reason that a singular limit tells us that our theory has failed in a certain domain.  
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^1	  Committee of Philosophy and the Sciences, University of Maryland, College ParkEmail.: wkallfel@umd.edu
^2	  In a broad sense, ‘emergence’ is construed in terms of the failure of the limits of reductionism and supervenience.  For instance, nomological emergence would characterize the failure of laws governing the behavior of a system S to properly reduce to laws governing S’s subconstituents.  Epistemological and ontological emergence (Silberstein & McGeever 1999), on the other hand, respectively refer to the failure of the theoretical terms describing S to reduce to those describing S’s constituents, versus the failure of S’s properties to reduce to those of S’s subconstituents.  As implied in these broad characterizations, the notion ‘subconstituents’ connotes mereological emergence in all three instances, i.e., discussion of ‘levels’ of aggregation.  But such talk of levels and parts/wholes, as we’ll come to see, is often questioned by authors in the recent literature as (at best) inadequate and (at worst) wholly misleading.  Moreover, it should be noted that the above three senses are obviously not semantically disjunct: Among basic issues, one cannot ignore the constitutive and regulative role that fundamental background beliefs and assumptions make in conditioning one’s basic assumptions concerning the nature of reliable regularities one experiences in the world (Hoefer (2002) 2). This clearly plays an essential metatheoretic role in what we deem as laws, proper theoretical terms, and properties, governing our choice of construction of theory-formation in the first place.  “[W]ith background beliefs of the right sort, just about anything can be confirmed irrespective of its status as a law or whether it is lawlike” (Carroll (2003), 7) to echo the venerable Quine-Duhem underdetermination thesis.     
^3	  Batterman (2002, 2003, 2004), Bishop (2004), Humphreys (1996), O’Connor & Wang (2003), Silberstein & McGeever (1999). 
^4	  “It is…possible that…standard divisions and hierarchies between phenomena that are considered fundamental and emergent, aggregate and simple, kinematic and dynamic, and perhaps even what is considered physical, biological, and mental are redrawn and redefined.” (Silberstein & McGeever, 1999, 200.)
^5	  And, for that matter, in its even more successful (primarily, and perhaps only in the sense of empirical adequacy) ever-proliferating renormalization group program (RGP).
^6	  relying, for the most part, on continuous phase-space geometric structures.
^7	   Broadly speaking, such analytical methods comprise examining ‘limiting cases’ in the mathematical framework of a theory, i.e. examining the qualitative and quantitative behavior of a theory’s term(s) in the  (or  0) limit, where  is one of the theory’s centrally governing parameters.  (In regular cases,  or / 0 are two tokens of the same type of limit: redefine / as 1/  in the second case.  However, in singular cases, depending on what fundamental parameters one chooses, such limits may fail to commute.)  For example, in the regular case of Special Relativity (SR), in the c  limit one recovers Galilean relativity (GalR).  In other words, the quantities in SR smoothly converge to those in GalR in a manner free of singularities.   Aside from the obvious quantitative and qualitative differences between SR and GalR, there are other subtle differences.  To name an abstract algebraic one: the Lorentz group LOR  is the relativity group of SR, i.e., the group of all its dynamical transformations, symmetric under the Lorentz transformations.  LOR  is simple, i.e., LOR  contains no proper invariant non-trivial subgroups (i.e. no proper subgroup H containing more than the identity such that: g  LOR  h  H : gh = hg.)  In the c  limit, LOR of course becomes GAL , the relativity group for GalR. GAL isn’t simple: the proper nontrivial subgroup of boosts is an example of such a nontrivial invariant subgroup H.  Asymptotic explanations essentially exploit the characteristics of asymptotic analysis in providing accounts of phenomena modeled by theories T, T/  (where T is the theory in the  = limit of some of  T/’s central parameter(s) .)  Only in the regular case can one say, for instance, that ‘the behavior of the theory at the limit equals the behavior of the theory in the limit,’ i.e.: lim T/ = T.
^8	  See footnote 7 here.  Of course, in a strict mathematical sense, due to ambiguities surrounding the nature of singularities, one should avoid saying things like: “ = .”  Consider this ‘equation’ here to mean “the behavior at the limit” for short.
^9	  Some writers, however, like Cherniak (1986), recommend that such a notion  should operate as a regulative norm in any theory which would place emphasis on cognitive agents and agency.  In a metatheoretic sense, in other words, specifically applying to specialized ‘human’ quantitative sciences (microeconomics, cognitive psychology, etc.), the ‘is’ of computational, logical, and cognitive limitations (usually spelled out precisely by venerable limitation theorems, conjectures, formulae) should inform the ‘oughts’ of theory-construction regarding assumptions made concerning the idealized agents.  So in this case, a notion of emergence informs an asymptotic manoever, as opposed to the latter constituting the former, in the case of Batterman.  
^10	  This simplest example of such a case involves the ‘three-body problem’ in classical mechanics:  Such a problem is unsolvable in the sense that one cannot derive the trajectories in the 6-dimensional phase space in the general case of three interacting force centers.  This is not to say that numerical and statistical approximation-schemes cannot aid in giving an account for classes of solutions, to an agreed-upon error.  But in a deductive nomological scheme, the classes of such regions wherein the (uncomputably) exact solution trajectory is bound, described by various topological regions by the approximation schemes, are epistemically emergent. 
^11	  An exception which includes entanglement in QM.  Though post-Bell experiments have conclusively established entanglement phenomena can violate classical statistics ascribed to only locally interacting subconstituents, thus making a case for ontological emergence (Silberstein & McGeever (1999) 189), the linear formalism of QM means that entangled states can be characterized in epistemically reducible (non-emergent) ways.
^12	  Precisely stated, for objects xri , xsi  at level i and at time t, endowed with respectively i-th level n & m -type  properties Pmi , Pni , then during time interval t = t’ – t they will fuse in such a manner to form a composite  i-th level object xci  xri  xsi = {xri , xsi } such that: Pmi(xri,t)* Pni(xsi,t) t [Pmi* Pni] (xci,t’)  Pki+1(xci,t’), where * is the fusion operation.  Note, for the sake of simplicity in this characterization, that only the properties fuse to become a higher-level properties.  (1996, 60).  For example, consider a wooden deck comprised of beams that are glued together.  Before the glue has dried, each beam  xri had the property Pri  that it was (relatively free) to move with respect to the other beams.  Once the glue has dried, the planks become rigid and in this characterization, their previous properties of relative mobility with respect to their neighbors vanishes, to fuse into the aggregate property Pki+1 of being able to support the weight(s) of person(s) standing on the deck. (1996, 65-66)
^13	  I.e., the cases involving the caustic structure in catastrophe optics (which result in asymptotic divergence, necessitating a complex amalgamation of geometrical optical structures (i.e., in the theory T) alongside the wave-theoretic ones (in the theory T/ )) as well as similar situations arising in semi-classical quantum theory.  Furthermore, although it’s important to keep in mind that in most cases, a singular limit occurs when h  0, i.e., most governing equations in quantum mechanics will not smoothly converge to those in classical mechanics in such a limit, this is not entirely the case.  For instance, the time-dependent Schroedinger equation (TDSE) will reduce smoothly to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (HJE) in such a limit (Herbert Goldstein Classical Mechanics 2nd ed. Addison-Wesley 1980, 489-492).  It must be added, however, that this case only pertains to simple, integrable systems and hence represents an exception to the general rule that such regular behavior in the limit is not possible in the case of non-integrable systems, which Batterman (2002) primarily discusses.  For instance, as in the case of catastrophe optics, likewise in the case of quantum chaos, do we witness in the effect of ‘Gutzweiler scarring,’ an intricate interplay and irreducible interdependence of quantum mechanical and classical mechanical structures (2002, 100-111). 
^14	  Batterman (2003) responds to Belot’s charge by supplying yet more examples from applied physics to convince the reader that the charge of reification of auxiliary mathematics fundamentally misses his most essential point(s).  In so many words, these points entail that especially in the singular limit, one can find numerous examples in physics whereby the physics in the limit (described by T) governs the phenomena depicted by theoretical terms in T /.  One sees this most clearly in the cases when initial or boundary  conditions are best described by T in such a manner, when lim T / does not exist.  “In arguing that an account … appeal[ing] to the mathematical idealization is explanatorily superior that does not invoke the idealization, I am not reifying the mathematics…I am claiming that the ‘fundamental’ theory that fails to take seriously the idealized ‘boundary’ is less explanatorily adequate.” (2003, 8).  For example, in the case of supersonic shock waves (phonons) propagating in a gas, the shock wavefront is idealized as a 2D surface, which is a divergence in the continuum mechanical limit.  Such a (2D) shock front however governs the dynamics of the gas, insofar as the (idealized) boundary conditions constitute the solutions of the differential equations of motion describing the propagation of density waves through the gas.  This is a physical fact, not an inappropriately reified mathematical artefact,.  
^15	   Batterman has not (yet) posted a direct response to Cohnitz, though Cohnitz is responding to some of Batterman’s earlier papers.  Since Cohnitz is focusing his one critique against Batterman’s somewhat construed mathematical example involving the ‘chaos game,’ it is hard to imagine how Cohnitz’s response can adequately deal with the later arsenal of examples Batterman invokes, in particular those that are found in his (2004) reply to Belot.  In particular, though one may grant to Cohnitz his claim that Hempel-Railton DSN models provide an adequate account of the chaos game, in the aforementioned cases in which boundary phenomena govern the physics described by T/ this becomes a different story.  In particular, the DSN model for statistical regularities exhibits the following structure:I. Demonstration through an analysis of the lawlike dynamical instabilities of systems s of type S, that S possesses certain strong statistical properties PSx t [PS (x,t)Pr(G(x,t+)=1]   0   s  S t [PS (s,t)Pr(G(s,t+)=1]   0Where G is the resultant property of interest, and Pr the probability.  (Cohnitz (2002) 31).  Now in the above mentioned case involving the governing of phenomena by (singular) initial and boundary-value conditions, either the DSN yields a trivial or a null account depending on the interpretation of G.  In the formerly (trivial case) if the boundary or initial valued effects drive the system’s dynamics, then we have strong correlation (so trivially) DSN formalizes this effect.  But is the explanation really deductive-nomological?  It all depends how one interprets G.  If property G  is instantiated by entities in T (the behavior of the theory at the limit) then we get a null answer, since it’s assumed here we’re dealing with entities and properties in the domain of T /.  If, on the other hand, one goes against Batterman and claims, a’ la Belot, the such properties G can be recovered entirely via mathematical gymnastics in the most abstractly mathematical characterization of T / , then we arrive at a trivial tautology:  the system S contains properties G one would expect it to contain after the boundary-value or initial value effects are taken into account.  In short, the solutions to the differential equations are the solutions to the differential equations one would expect, in a correct calculation.  But in that case, lest one feel that the DSN model has been ideally vindicated, one could always drop the ‘statistical’ modifier altogether.  In either case, it’s hard to see how Hempel-Railton accounts shed any light in the complex interplay of structures in T and in T’ in the singular asymptotic limit.  In the light of Belot’s and Cohnitz’s critiques, and Battermans’s response to Belot, perhaps Wilson (2003) grasped Batterman’s (2002) points most essentially, when he writes that: Batterman’s discussion of ‘theories between theories’ makes a contrary tempering moral quite plain: much real understanding within science comes in the form of appreciating the patterns in which different types and mathematical descriptions intermingle – through understanding the interface along which one mode of description breaks down and where some opposed mode needs to take over.  Such mixing of means is quite different from the blithe ‘autonomy’ that those of the ‘supervenience’ school expect to see in their ‘higher level theories’…[I]n truth, such ‘levels’ often mix together in very interesting patterns of mutual reinforcement. (2)…We often do not achieve descriptive success through autonomous micro- or macroscopic tools, but through utilizing a complex intermingling of ideas, which often obey quite complicated strategies of interdependence.  These mixed techniques shall be regarded…as signatures of various forms of mathematical accommodation between microscopic and macroscopic behaviors (the nature of boundary conditions utilized often supplies a critical ingredient within this signature.)…[W]e could do no better than…examine carefully the complex structure of revealing case [studies]…rather than continuing to languish in the crude dichotomies of ‘reduction’ versus ‘supervenience.’ (6)
^16	   To invoke the well-worn Marxist cliché in its critique against Whig history.  
^17	  For instance, in an earlier paper  I subjected the RGP applied to the case of the IR (infrared) limit in turbulence to the classification scheme of Mark Steiner’s (The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem Cambridge, MASS: Harvard U Press: 1998) illuminating semantic analysis of some contemporary physical theories, to show that the governing analogies were (hopelessly) ‘doubly Pythagorean’ (in Steiner’s sense.)  This implies, among other things, that despite the apparent success of RGP at characterizing universal behavior in manifold instances, one should at best assume an instrumentalist position.  RGP is stunningly empirically adequate, based on our best contemporary resolving power of measurement in some instances in renormalizable theories such as QED, but then again so was Ptolemaic astronomy at one point in history.  In the latter case, aside from anomalous naked eye discrepancies involved in the observed instances of Mars’ orbit, the (essentially Fourier analytic/synthetic) schemes of Ptolemaic approximation devices, denoted by artifacts ‘epicycles’ and ‘equants’, provided empirically adequate predictions for centuries.  By the same token, the artifacts such as ‘dressed parameters’ and ‘subtraction parameters’ employed by RG methods, give results that are considered just as empirically adequate by contemporary researchers, and at the same time, just as unphysical. 
^18	  “I believe that in many instances our explanatory physical practice demands that we appeal essentially to (infinite) idealizations.  But I don’t believe that this involves the reification of the idealized structures.” (Batterman (2003), 7).  These two sentences spell out the tension(s) in the themes Batterman is advancing: On the one hand, appeal essentially  to infinite idealizations when explaining the phenomena, on the other hand we’re told not to reify such structures.  Aside from not providing a clear explanation of how  one can adhere to such orthogonal purposes, it’s a concession to Cohnitz’s Claim (II): One cannot cut the route to further (explanatory) reduction if one knows that the underlying mechanisms are different from those depicted in the explanans. (2002, 34).  Perhaps this concession is satisfactory for Batterman, as he likewise seeks to sever the connection between explanation and reduction, but this is hardly satisfying to the practicing theoretical physicist, with other than an instrumentalist leaning.  The usual reaction one would expect from the latter would entail seeking some route to further explanatory reduction.
^19	  I.e., 	where: N is the number of particles, V the volume of the system			and , i.e. the number density, which is held fixed.
^20	  Batterman seems to make this claim to bolster his earlier remark (2004, 12) that physical discontinuities (like phase transitions) are “correctly represented” by mathematical singularities.  It is precisely this latter notion that I call into question, which I will develop in greater detail in the following section.
^21	  Here, the governing parameter  = (me/mN)1/4 where me is the mass of the orbital electron, and mN  the mass of the nucleon, i.e. one forms an asymptotic series S() =kakk.
^22	  Reduction? (Can ontology be reduced to toplogy?  If so, how? (Cross-wise, top-down (Cartwright (1999))?  Or does ontology supervene on topology, or is emergence a better way to understand the relation?  Does ontology constitute topology, and/or conversely does topology regulate ontology?  Or are, on the other hand, topology and ontology part of the relata of relationship depicting nomological necessity? Etc.
^23	  Here I am referring in particular to David Lewis’s notion that laws of nature “belong to all true deductive systems with a best combination of simplicity [e.g. a minimum number of ad-hoc assumptions and axioms] and strength [i.e., predictive and expressive and explanatory power].” (Carroll (2003), 3.) 
^24	  For example, quantum mechanics does remove the singularities found in general relativity which depict black hole phenomena.  Vaccum fluctuations, resulting in pair production, governed by Heisenberg Uncertainty, ‘blur’ the otherwise ‘sharp’ singular edge at the black hole’s event horizon.  Among other things, this results in the mechanism of Hawking radiation and thus gives us an overall better understanding of such phenomena. 
^25	  Although, as perhaps suggested by my use of the phrase “behavior at the limit,” Batterman (2002) takes pains in many places to clarify that the superseded theory T is ‘contained in’ the superseding theory T / , just not in a way in which the structures of T  can be straightforwardly derived in any D-N scheme.  (Hence the philosophical novelty of asymptotic explanations.):	How different asymptotic reasoning is from the usual understanding of how solutions to equations are to be gotten…asymptotic analysis of singular limiting intertheoretic relations typically yield new structures that are not solutions to the fundamental, governing equations…So ‘predictable from fundamental theory’ is somewhat ambiguous.  In the one sense, the solutions are contained in the fundamental…equations.  This is the sense in which asymptotic analysis enables one to find mathematical representations of these solutions.  On the other hand, the understanding of these mathematical representations requires reference to structures foreign to the fundamental theory.  In this sense, they are unpredictable from fundamental theory. (2002, 96)  It is fruitful [therefore] to think of emergence in terms of pairs of theories and their relationships …After all, the very notion of predictability and explainability are theory-relative.  These epistemic notions depend on metaphysical or ontological relations between theories—relations that require a sufficient mathematization of the theories in order to be seen. (2002, 128)
^26	  For instance, in “Quantum Sets and Clifford Algebras,” International Journal of Theoretical Physics, vol 21 n6/7 (1982) 
^27	  A seemingly inexhaustible well of physical and philosophical ink has been spilled in response to the problem of reconciling quantum theory with our currently most successful theory of spacetime.  I certainly don’t wish to add anything here in this brief essay, though I will mention in passing that just examining the semantically disjunt ontologies of the two theories gives one just a small taste of the sheer formidability of the problem.  In terms of their respective ontologies, though the Standard Model represents a culmination of some of the most lavish developments in quantum field theory, it is nevertheless ‘Newtonian’ in the sense that the fundamental interactions rest in a flat spacetime (or static geometry, i.e. a constant (Lorentz) metric ) like, to paraphrase Einstein’s analogy, ‘actors on a stage’.  Whereas, of course, in the case of General Relativty, the fundamental interaction (gravity) doesn’t ‘rest’ in anything, but rather is relegated as being a metrical property of spacetime itself, inducing a dynamical geometry, depicted as a Riemannian manifold whose dynamics is governed by the variable Riemannian metric g.
^28	  Paul Humphreys, “How Properties Emerge,” Philosophy of Science 64 (1997): 1-17, p15. 
^29	    For instance, consider two 2D quantum systems A, B (spanned respectively by bases{| 0A, |1A} {| 0B, |1B} ).Consider the initial composite system to be in (separable) state |AB(0) = 1/2{| 0A + |1A}  {| 0B -|1B} )= 1/2{| 0A |0B - | 0A|1B  + | 1A|0B - | 1A|1B }  1/2{|00 - |01 + |10 - |11} (using this shorthand representation for denoting the ordering of base elements in the composite system.  Consider a system Hamitonian:H ={ |0000| + |0110| + |1001|  - |1111|}.  Then its unitary time-evolution operator U(t,0) = exp(-i2Ht/h) , after time t = h/4 :  U(h/4,0) = -i{ |0000| + |0110| + |1001|  - |1111|}.  Hence |AB(0) (initially separable) now evolves into the entangled state: |AB(h/4) = -i/2{|00 - |01 + |10 + |11}.
^30	  Carlo Rovelli, makes a similar claim, in his “Relational Quantum Mechanics” (1997) http://fr.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9609/9609002.pdf.  However, for Finkelstein (1996) the action-algebraic semantics arises as a way to compensate for the non-commutativity of quantum acts, preventing a complete characterization of the system.  For Rovelli, the lack of a state has to do with his relational ontology introduced as a means to solve the measurement problem.
^31	   I.e., at their ‘interface’ – described by the limits of the ultimate resolving powers of the theory.
^32	  The subtitle of Quantum Relativity is “A Synthesis of the Ideas of Einstein and Heisenberg.”  The order of names here is significant.  Though following Heisenberg’s directive to extend a discrete topological -algebraic approach as much as possible, somewhat of  a common trend among some contemporary theoretical particle physicists (as remarked by H.S. Green, Information Theory and Quantum Physics.  Physical Foundations for Understanding the Conscious Process.  Springer Verlag, 2000, p. 207), locality and the reciprocating action governing the coupling of the Hilbert action and the Minkowski metric act as metatheoretic constraints and guiding principles for selecting an action principle governing the variable (and fundamentally discrete) microtopology of the pattern of chronon interactions. 
^33	  “On the Contractions of Groups and Their Representations” Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences 39 (1952) 510-525
^34	  I.e., contains no non-trivial proper invariant subgroups (see footnote 8).
